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ABSTRACT
The rights of migrant workers and their experiences in host countries have been high on the
political agendas of Europe and beyond. This article uses data from 138 semi-structured inter-
views conducted with migrant workers in the UK, Russia and Ukraine to study their relation-
ships with the police in host countries. We aim to contribute to the literature on policing and
migration by analysing three different host countries, and the experience of temporary migrant
workers regarding policing within each country. We suggest that the interplay between the
experiences of policing in home and host countries can provide important insights into the
practicalities of policing, but should not be considered apart from the context of the ethnic ori-
gin of migrant workers.
INTRODUCTION
This article explores the experiences of migrant workers in host countries (the countries of destina-
tion) and more specifically, their experience of policing. One Moscow-based Ukrainian migrant
worker gave the following account:
June 12th, 2011, Moscow: “On the way home from work at around 11 pm I came across two
policemen. First, they hesitate a little, then they approached me and asked to present my docu-
ments. I show my Ukrainian passport and my migration card (I have received my migration card at
the border crossing point).
They (police) say, “You can buy this paper [migration card] for 50 roubles at any train station”.
“But this is not my problem,” I reply.
They say, “Ok, but you will have to follow us to the police station for the document check.”
Thinking about my early start the following morning, and also the fact that visiting a police station
is rather dangerous, I reply, “My documents are all legal, but here we go, take 100 roubles and I
will go”. I open the notebook where I keep small cash, I have 110 roubles (from years of experi-
ence, I know that it is important to separate the cash for police from the cash in my purse).
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They, “What, 100 roubles only?! Do you know how big the fines are these days?”
I reply, “What fines?! All my documents are in order, this is just so I don’t have to go to your sta-
tion.”
They, “Ok then, only out of respect to your age”, and they take the 110 roubles, all that they can
see.”
From the Diary of a 65 years old Ukrainian migrant worker in Moscow.
This quote is representative of the daily experience of migrant workers in different parts of the
world. From South Africa to Ukraine and in Russia, migrant workers often present a highly visible
and vulnerable group. This issue is not new. Melossi (2015) analysed European and American
approaches to dealing with migration and migrant workers and argued that the way these groups are
perceived in society depends “on the receiving norms and practices of the countries where they are
admitted” (p.87). It is often the case that excessive policing of migrant groups is supported by pop-
ulist thinking about migrant workers as “undeserving others”. The socio-cultural context of the host
country is as important to study as socio-cultural heritage of the communities of migrant workers.
Light (2010) discusses the ways migration policies are enforced in the city of Moscow and distin-
guishes between “violation of the law by officials to secure private financial gains (that is, corrup-
tion) and the targeting of particular individuals for differential treatment based on ethnic origins
(that is, ethnic discrimination)” (p. 293). Understanding the convergence of migration policies and
policing will inform an understanding of the street policing experience of some vulnerable groups.
The project was originally proposed in 2010 with the aim of understanding the experience of
crime and policing among Ukrainian migrant workers in the UK and in Russia, but was later
developed to consider three distinct groups of migrant workers in three different settings. This arti-
cle is based on 138 interviews with migrant workers conducted in three countries: the UK, Russia
and Ukraine in the summer of 2011. We begin with a brief overview of the politics of migration,
moving on to discuss the experience of policing by migrant workers in host and home countries.
POLICING MIGRANT WORKERS
Police corruption can be discovered in any country. However in some countries, such as Russia and
Ukraine, corruption within the police force may be considered as part of the system of governance.
Light (2010) argues that in Russia, and specifically in Moscow, “police interact with the civilian
political authorities in the actual implementation of particular policies to produce outcomes – enforce-
ment- that may be illegal or extra-legal” (Light, 2010, p. 277). Police corruption in post-Soviet coun-
tries has been presented as a legacy of the Soviet past (Shelley, 1990), resulting in impoverished,
unresponsive and powerful social institutions that are on a mission to find new ways of exercising
control (Beck and Chistyakova, 2002; McCarthy, 2013; Friesendorf, 2017). Beck and Chistyakova
(2002) report on the study of policing in the city of Kharkiv, Ukraine, where the public perceived the
police “as a powerful group using its authority for its own end, and able to violate the law if they
need to do so” (p.130). This particular style of policing is labelled “predatory policing” (Light, 2010).
Light (2010) argues that the best way to understand policing in the Post-Soviet realm is to study
police interaction with the authorities. While analysing Moscow’s migration control and enforce-
ment, Light (2010) notices that “police corruption is shaped by the intersection between the private
interests of the police and the political agenda of their masters” (p.277). In this sense, police simply
respond to initiatives from “their political masters” (Ibid.). The messages of these political masters
are often one-sided, presenting migrant populations as essentially criminal and “undeserving others”.
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Beck and Lee (2002) discuss the following three opportunities for police officers to act corruptly:
the use of discretion; the lack of an effective anti-corruption institutional framework; and the public
acceptance of corrupt policing. The use of discretion by police officers has been the subject of
debate in many countries, but the effectiveness of anti-corruption campaigns, and the public attitude
towards corruption, have been major concerns of countries in transition. In the UK policing differ-
ent ethnic communities has been a subject of intense debate (Junger, 1990; Bowling, Parmar, Phil-
lips, 2003). It has been recognized that different ethnic groups have very different experiences of
policing, with a disproportionate use of stop and search powers targeting certain ethnic groups
(Bowling, Parmar, Phillips, 2003). Light (2010) demonstrated in his Moscow study that police mis-
conduct and corruption are often “sanctioned” by the prevailing political agenda. So, a loose defini-
tion of police discretion can be heavily exploited and is open to specific interpretation. Light
(2010) considers the police in Moscow to be an agent of political power that is tasked with “limit-
ing legal residence and harassing migrants”, and thus they cannot be simply viewed as “self-inter-
ested parties pursuing their own enrichment” (p.301). Russia and Ukraine evince different policing
styles of migrant workers, which can generally be defined as being extra-legal policing tactics in
Russia and functional corruption in Ukraine.
THE POLITICS OF MIGRATION
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the issue of internal economic migration become an interna-
tional issue almost overnight. The regulatory regimes that followed, in both Russia and Ukraine,
can be characterized as chaotic, lacking strategic vision, and often focused on the introduction of
harsh laws. Light (2010) explains the development of the regulatory framework towards migrant
labourers in the “closed city” of Moscow during Soviet times, and the reactive policing of mass
phenomena such as unlawful residency in Moscow in post-Soviet times. Labour migrants in Russia
are required to acquire residence registration and obtain a work permit within 30 days of arriving
in Russia. Both procedures are highly complex, but supported by legal and illegal markets that
facilitate different ways of dealing with the system (Urinboev, 2017; Light, 2010).
Ukrainian state policy regarding international labour migrants has also been “haphazard and frag-
mented in all its areas” (Fedirko, 2015, p.84). Although Ukrainian laws “On the Legal Status of
Foreigners and Stateless Persons” and “On Immigration” define several relevant categories such as
“foreigner”, “stateless person”, and “immigrant”, there is no clear definition of the term “migrant
worker” (Fedirko, 2015; Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2001 and 2011). In both Russia and Ukraine,
therefore, there is a legislative paradox with prohibitively strict regulations on the one hand, and an
absence of clearly defined rights for migrant workers on the other. Zabyelina (2017) notes that:
“the embeddedness of labour migration in the shadow economy promotes a business model that
depends on a constant circulation of foreign labourers who are underpaid, insecure and ready to tol-
erate the unfair conditions” (p.95).
In contrast, the UK is a country where migrant workers can be roughly divided into two groups:
those arriving from the European Union and those from other countries. The EU legal framework,
combined with national enforcement mechanisms, has developed a stable legal background for
migrant workers within the EU (subject to the uncertainties of the current Brexit negotiations).
The recent rise of populist political sentiment in Europe and beyond suggests that an antipathetic
social attitude towards “others” dominates current debate (Melossi, 2000). The idea of the criminal
migrant has influenced the political agenda in many countries, resulting in a perception that eco-
nomic migrants tend to be criminals. Commenting on Melossi’s dichotomy in categorizing immi-
grants, Cohen suggests that UK society’s antipathy towards migrant workers could be equated with
a “moral panic” (Cohen, 2011). This panic was bolstered by the media’s coining the term,
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“criminal migrant” (see Endley, 2014; Hamilton, 2015; Drury, 2016). Behaviour perceived as
“criminal” by immigrants ranges from violent crime to claiming benefits, wanting “something for
nothing” (former Prime Minister David Cameron in an ITV interview, 2016). In the months leading
up to the June 2016 UK Referendum on EU membership, the leader of UKIP identified migration
as a principal issue of concern, “Leave’s central argument that the UK cannot control the number
of people coming into the country while remaining in the EU really hit home” (BBC, 2016b).
The views of UKIP resonate strongly with the views of officials in Russia, and specifically in
Moscow. Abashin (2017) discusses how the 2013 Moscow mayoral election raised the issue of
migration to the top of the agenda: “numerous phobias that had been previously morally or politi-
cally-censored gained in this debate a rather legitimate, politically-acceptable and even, in some
senses, approved nature” (p.25). For example, Lassila (2017) analysed political discourse regarding
migrant workers during elections and quotes one of the candidates during the campaign who said:
“I’m not worried about the numbers related to migration, I am worried about every stolen handbag
from women in my region” (p. 57). Commenting on recent migration policy, the mayor of Mos-
cow, Mr Sobyanin, stated: “the most important achievement of reforms in foreign labour policies is
the fact that there is a significant (30%) decline in criminality amongst migrant workers”. The
mayor essentially represented migrant workers as a criminal class, repeating statistics suggesting
that, in previous years, more than half of all crimes in Moscow were committed by migrants (Inter-
fax, 2016). Such claims are highly controversial: they depend on biased policing and ignore the
issue of the victimization of migrant workers and the immigrant population in general. In evidence,
Obrazkova (2013) cites the raid on illegal migrant workers in Moscow that uncovered about 900
Vietnamese illegal workers. The authorities represented this case as a raid on illegal migrants, even
though Human Rights activists have argued that the raid in fact uncovered slavery and exploitation
(Ibid.). Light (2010) identifies an uneasy symbiosis that exists between government and the police:
“some kinds of police abuse are tolerated by the city (even though not desired) because they are
necessarily attendant on other kinds of abuse (which are desired)” (p.303).
In Ukraine, social antipathy towards migrants and xenophobia is also widespread. Fedirko (2015)
quotes research conducted by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology that suggests “19.4% of
respondents would prefer not to give permission to immigrants from poor countries to live and
work in Ukraine” (p.84). This is surprising when we consider that over the past 20 years up to 15
per cent of people of working age left Ukraine in search of work abroad (Radchuk, 2016), and in
fact the official number of migrant workers in Ukraine remains small.
By contrast, regarding the UK’s ‘sympathetic’ social perspective, a moral panic has also emerged
that emphasizes that immigrants are often the victims of crimes (Dugan, 2015; Cowan, 2016; Adesina
& Fayaz, 2016). The UK’s Modern Day Slavery Act 2015 was considered “landmark legislation”
(May, 2015) that aimed at strengthening protections for survivors (Haughey, 2016). However, despite
this legislative progress, the practical investigation of exploitation and slavery remains very difficult.
In this article we are interested in the way migrant workers view the police in host and home
countries, and the interaction between home and host experiences of policing. We are seeking to
understand similarities and differences in policing experiences across different locations.
METHODOLOGY
The data for our study were collected in 2011-2012 and include 138 semi-structured interviews
with migrant workers (Table 1). The ethics review was conducted according to the Anglia Ruskin
University ethics procedure. We used a community-based respondent driven sample of migrant
workers in three field areas: England, Russia and Ukraine. It was important to us to contrast polic-
ing in the migrants’ country of origin from policing in their country of destination or host country.
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Based on the 2010 Corruption Perception Indexes of Transparency International (TI, 2010), we
have assigned our respondents to the following groups: those from countries that experience a high
level of corruption (Ukraine and Nigeria) moving to host countries with a high level of corruption
(Russia and Ukraine); and those from countries that experience a high level of corruption (Lithua-
nia) moving to host a country with a significantly lower level of corruption (the UK).
TABLE 1




Mean Min Max Median SD* Variance
Russia 30,88 18,00 65,00 27,50 10,46 109,47
England 31,34 19,00 55,00 29,00 9,42 88,66
Ukraine 41,27 30,00 54,00 42,00 7,11 50,62
Gender (% and N of cases)
Male Female
Russia 100% (52) 0%
England 58,1% (36) 41,9% (26)
Ukraine 90,9% (20) 9,1% (2)
Marital status (%)
Single Married Divorced Widowed
Russia 46,2% 42,3% 11,5% 0,0%
England 43,3% 46,7% 10,0% 0,0%
Ukraine 9,1% 81,8% 0,0% 9,1%
Number of children (%)
1 2 3 4
Russia 23,1% 53,8% 23,1% 0,0%
England 29,4% 52,9% 11,8% 5,9%







Russia 53,8% 34,6% 7,7% 3,8%
England 30,0% 13,3% 43,3% 13,3%
Ukraine 0,0% 27,3% 63,6% 9,1%
*SD = Standard Deviation
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Respondent-driven sampling (RDS), or snowball sampling, was used in all three field areas.
Migrant workers were approached through their national communities by introduction by a commu-
nity representative. This significantly increased the level of participant trust during interviews, and
thus improved data validity. In Moscow, our first contact was a person with a university degree in the
natural sciences, who had resigned from his low-paid job in a research institute in Ukraine to begin a
self-employed career as a migrant worker in Moscow. During the summer of 2011 this person volun-
teered to keep a diary of his encounters with the police, his employers, and the public in Moscow.
This diary reveals useful and often hidden insights into the subject’s routine encounters with corrupt
police officers, and his rationalization of these encounters. We quote extracts from this diary with the
permission of its author. In Moscow all interviews were conducted in Russian and took place outside
the participant’s hostels. In total, 52 respondents were interviewed; 47 Ukrainians, 3 Uzbekistanis
and 2 Moldovans. Respondents from Uzbekistan and Moldova did not answer any of the open-ended
questions, and our attempts to increase their numbers in the sample were not successful. So, the Mos-
cow sample is mostly representative of the experience of Ukrainian workers.
The Nigerian community was approached through a community leader, a graduate of an Ukrainian
university. This community leader had advised us that there were a number of Nigerian migrant work-
ers selling goods at the Barabashova open market, one of the biggest open markets in Eastern Ukraine,
situated in Kharkiv. There, we were able to approach a dispersed group of sellers, working at different
locations and selling varied goods. Interviews were conducted in English and took place either in the
open market or in its cafe. During our interviews all Nigerian respondents identified themselves as
migrant workers. In total 22 Nigerians were interviewed in the city of Kharkiv.
Lithuanian migrant workers were approached through members of the Lithuanian cultural com-
munity during a community organized cultural event in Cambridge. Interviews took place in a vari-
ety of locations in Cambridge, Huntingdon and Kings Lynn. In all, 64 Lithuanians were
interviewed in England, in Norfolk and Cambridgeshire.
With regard to our methodology, there are three important clarifications. Firstly, one disadvantage
of our sample is a significant underrepresentation of female migrant workers. Due to time constraints,
it was necessary to recruit respondents from compact samples. For example, in Moscow, most of our
respondents were renting rooms in an old students’ hall of residence (“obshezhitie” in Russian). All
these residents were males employed at different building sites in Moscow. The International Organi-
sation for Migration (IOM, 2017) estimates that one third of expatriate Ukrainian migrant male
workers are employed in construction. Identifying female migrant workers would require a different
approach due to the different nature of their employment, such as child-minding or housekeeping.
The second point to be made concerns the issue of the migration flow and the political situation
that has a potential to affect the sample. In 2011, Ukrainian migrant workers considered Moscow a
popular destination. However, since the beginning of the conflict in the East of Ukraine in 2014, the
Ukrainian pattern of work migration has changed. According to IOM (2017), in Ukraine “the prefer-
ence of the Russian Federation as a country of destination continues to decrease (from 18% of
respondents who expressed the desire to work abroad in 2011, to 12% in 2015, and to 9% in 2017)”.
The third issue to take into consideration is the issue of self-identification, specifically identifying
oneself as a migrant worker. We relied on our respondents to identify their status. While an official
definition of a migrant worker exists in the UK and Russia, in Ukraine, incoming foreign work
migration is a relatively new issue. According to the State Border Guard Service control, 90 per
cent of foreigners arrive in Ukraine as private tourists (Fedirko, 2015). The official data on incom-
ing labour migration for the period of 2006-2013 revealed that they represented less than one per
cent of the total number of foreigners arriving. In 2008 there were 12,200 foreign migrant workers
registered (Fedirko, 2015). We note, however, that official data on migrant labour can miss a sig-
nificant proportion of foreigners arriving in Ukraine to work but remaining on student visas. In
2016, the number of foreign students in Ukraine reached 63,906, including about 3,500 from Nige-
ria (Ministry of Education and Science, 2016).
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Fourthly, there is reluctance to talk about the experience of policing. This was evident when
approaching migrant workers from Uzbekistan and Moldova. The distrust of authorities, and any
members of the public who can potentially represent authority, was particularly visible in this sample.
We consider that the best way to explore the experience of a particular group was to be introduced by
a member of this group, although that did not happen in the case of the two groups named above.
The questionnaire comprised of 99 quantitative and qualitative (open-ended) indicators. The mea-
sures for this study were selected by the authors based on their previous experience of using these
measures in their Ukrainian and UK research, where such had shown good diagnostic properties
with sensitive criminological indicators (Serduyk & Markovska 2012a; Serduyk & Markovska,
2012b). The interviews covered nine themes concerning the participants’ relationship with the
police in their home and host nations, their experience as victims and as perpetrators of crime, their
experiences of xenophobia and racism (Personal experience; Bogardus scale; Ethnohomogenic Ori-
entation Scale), and their experiences of corruption. Data were analysed using the software package
SPSS v17. Cross-tabulation themes were extracted from the open-ended questions in order to con-
textualize, code and categorize answers for each group of the respondents.
The quantitative indicators as described below (Table 3) were measured with the help of a 5 posi-
tional scale (Yes, Rather Yes, Neutral, Rather No, No). For convenience, the data were re-coded to
assign numerical value to the answers: Yes = +1; Rather yes = +0.5; Neutral = 0; Rather No = -0.5;
No = -1. Indices fluctuate from -1 to +1. This measure represents the median average of participant
responses to a given issue. -1 indicates a wholly negative, disagreeing response to a question or state-
ment. +1 indicates a wholly positive, agreeing response to a question or statement. For example,
regarding the question; “Is there a denial of a crime problem among migrant workers”, a -1 score
would mean that participants believe there to be a complete denial of a crime problem existing among
migrant workers. Whereas a +1 score would mean the complete agreement of participants that a such
crime problem existed (see the study variables table at the end of this article).
RESULTS
Each group of migrant workers has a unique immigration situation that has developed due to the
socio-economic and political conditions in their country of destination (Table 2).
Data collected during the interviews suggest the following:
1) On average, Ukrainian migrant workers in Russia stayed in the country for 17 months. The goal
of this short stay was to earn enough money to accumulate a sizable sum, then return to Ukraine.
2) The average stay of the Lithuanian workers in England was 59 months.
3) An average length of stay for Nigerian migrant workers in Ukraine was 145 months. During
the interviews it transpired that there were at least two specific groups of migrant workers
from Nigeria: those who came to work or study, and those who used Ukraine as a transit stop
on the way to other Western European destinations.
Overall, respondents in our study can be divided into two groups of temporary migrant workers:
those arriving for a short stay, “to earn and leave” (in Russia), and migrants who intend to stay in
the country for longer periods (England and Ukraine).
CRIMINALITY AND MIGRATION
Migrants’ personal understanding of criminality within their community is presented in Figure 1
below. It shows that in Russia, migrants tend to deny the problem of criminality within their com-
munity while in England, respondents accepted its existence.
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Contrary to the official view in Moscow that “migrants used to commit half of all the crime in
the city” (Interfax, 2016), work migrants in our sample are very critical of the media representation
of migrant workers as criminals.
Victimization and Criminalization at Work
Respondents were asked to comment on the organization of their day-to day work. We wanted to
know if the nature of their employment encouraged its perception as being linked with criminality
and victimization. Indices of these estimates are shown in Figure 2 below.
The distribution of indices is represented between -1 and +1 regarding the “victimization of
work-related activities” (the belief that the organization of work related activities leads to criminal
activity against migrant workers) and “criminogenic work activities of migrant workers” (the belief
that the organization of work-related activities leads to migrant workers engagement in criminal
activity in their country of destination). In Figure 2, -1 means total denial, and +1 means total
agreement. It shows the distribution of the perception of the victimization of work related activity
and criminogenic work related activity with regard to migrant workers in England, Ukraine &
Russia.
TABLE 2
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE VARIABLE “LENGTH OF STAY IN HOST COUNTRY (COUNTRY
OF DESTINATION)”*
Host country (country of destination) Mean Min Max Median SD Variance
Russia 16,77 0,50 70,00 7,25 18,81 353,99
England 59,00 2,00 180,00 60,00 41,02 1682,84
Ukraine 145,45 60,00 216,00 172,00 52,89 2797,67
*length of stay in host country (country of destination) measured in months; SD = Standard deviation
FIGURE 1








Notes: -1 means “denial”, +1 means “acceptance” of perception that criminality can be linked to the community of
migrant workers.
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TABLE 3
STUDY VARIABLES (QUANTITATIVE)






























































































































1/0,5/0/-0,5/-1 0,38 (0,28) 0,45 (0,76)
*Variable measured according host country (country of destination) and home country (country of origin),
the formulation of the question changes depending on the variable; SD = Standard deviation
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An analysis of the types of crimes migrant workers are perceived as being involved in, suggests
the following. In Russia migrant workers mostly work illegally without paying taxes or registering
for work and residency officially. The main explanation offered for this is difficulties with bureau-
cracy; as one respondent put it “I am a forced illegal”. In the UK (with regard to the Lithuanian
migrant workers) the main problems reported were tax evasion and hooliganism. In Ukraine, Nige-
rian migrant workers reported that tax evasion and drug trafficking were the major concerns,
although many noted that the latter had declined by 2010.
Regarding crimes committed against migrant workers, the data suggest a different situation. In
Russia, migrant workers reported victimization and extortion by police officers and misleading ver-
bal work contracts as being major concerns. It was often the case that these workers would be pro-
mised a certain level of pay but then, after the work was done, they would not be paid the agreed
amount. Such unjust, fraudulent, practices are perceived as an institutional norm by migrant work-
ers in Russia. This is supported by the following diary extract:
“The main aim of any employer is to pay less and to earn more. Even in cases of legal employ-
ment you can be deprived of your usual bonus for ‘long-hours payment’ with little explanation. In
my current legal employment, 30% of our salary is considered as a bonus payment. This bonus
payment comes and goes without consultation. When considering illegal employment, it is essential
to receive good recommendation, meaning that the employer actually pays. The standard practice
of the illegal employment is to offer minimum pay for food during the duration of the project and
refuse to pay at the end, suggesting some sort of troubles within the organisation. . .I have never
heard about the situation when legal or illegal employed migrant worker officially complained
about non-payment”.
This failure of employers to comply with either written or oral contracts is reported by both leg-
ally and illegally employed migrant workers. In both Russia and Ukraine, the informal sector of
the economy is significant (Polese, 2014). Informal employment is employment that is not regis-
tered officially and therefore hidden from the state (Ibid.). Theoretically, employment within the
formal sector of the economy should be protected; in practice, however, migrant workers do not
FIGURE 2













Notes: -1 means “totally disagree”, +1 means “totally agree” with statements that “employment rights of migrant workers are
not protected by law and this situation encourages informality and criminal conduct against migrant workers” and “the nature
of employment encourages illegal conduct by migrant workers in the country of destination”.
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enjoy significant protection. On a personal level, it is the trustworthiness and honesty of their
employers that provide any security to the migrant worker.
In England, Lithuanian migrant workers tend to be better protected by law. In 2011 Lithuanian
migrant workers identified hooliganism and theft as the main crimes committed against them within
their community. One Lithuanian respondent reported a rising level of informal settling-in practices
within the migrant communities. Such practices included an established migrant worker helping
newcomers to rent rooms and arrange a cheap supply of alcohol and cigarettes from Lithuania.
These practices can potentially provide an opportunity for exploitation when applied to vulnerable
migrant workers.
The above practice of the abuse of vulnerable members of the same migrant community has also
been reported in Russia. Urinboyev (2017) describes a group of migrant workers from the same vil-
lage in Uzbekistan. They were forced to live in terrible conditions on a building site, and were left
without pay for over three months by those who were meant to “look after them”, men from the
same village who had arrived in Moscow earlier. Such exploitation is considered to be an everyday
reality for thousands of migrant workers in Moscow. Specific terminology to describe such
exploitation and abuse has not yet, however, reached the level of popular political discourse in
either Russia or Ukraine. Migrant workers in our Moscow and Kharkiv samples largely agreed that
the informality of their working arrangements coupled with police corruption has a significant
impact on their safety. The following extract from a diary cited earlier is a poignant reminder of
this:
“Two years ago I worked at a building site during winter months. Many workers were illegal, and
stayed on-site overnight, sleeping in wooden sheds. In the evening, the site would usually be vis-
ited by police to extort money. In order to avoid this, labourers would lock themselves in from the
outside. One cold night the heater caught fire and burned 3 workers alive”.
The Ukrainian migrant workers emphasized that such criminal activity on the part of the police
was directly encouraged by to their illegal status and the difficulty of obtaining legal work. How-
ever, even when their employment and status are legal, migrant workers are forced to pay bribes to
the police in Moscow. These experiences of victimization by migrant workers stand in striking con-
trast with official statements. In 2016, the mayor of Moscow asked police officers and volunteers
from various public crime-prevention teams to continue activities aimed at identifying and sup-
pressing illegal migration into the city (Interfax, 2016). However, human rights activists in Moscow
argue that such victimization is the result of officials’ heavy-handed response to the vexed issue of
labour migration in the public perception and a lack of initiative to tackle labour exploitation and
slavery (Obrazkova, 2013).
Most of the Nigerian migrant workers interviewed in Ukraine worked at the biggest open mar-
ket in the city of Kharkiv, selling clothes and accessories. Most of them worked on their own
behalf or were employed by fellow members of their community. Most identified extortion, theft,
and hooliganism (mainly racially motivated) as their main concerns. One Nigerian migrant
worker reported: “drunken people who want to fight are my biggest problems”. . . “they call us
monkeys”. From our conversation it transpired that many Nigerians are “zoning” the city, and
understand the dangers to them that different zones present. For example, the city centre with its
many universities is considered to be a relatively safe zone. Their place of work (the market)
and their “sleeping” districts represent areas of danger. In these zones, even walking the streets
can pose problems. For example, police officers may stop and search an individual, and extort
money from them. Also, racially motivated attacks from locals at any time of day remain a pos-
sibility. In the evening, the threat of physical violence is present from drunk, aggressive and
homophobic local men.
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RELATIONSHIP WITH POLICE IN THE HOST COUNTRY
We are interested in migrant workers’ experience of policing at street level. Figure 3 shows the dis-
tribution of indices of their subjective estimation of policing in the host country.
The interaction of migrant workers with the police differs significantly between the three countries
investigated. In Russia and Ukraine, respondents tend to believe that illegal police activity is wide-
spread. In contrast, participants from England reported that illegal activities committed by police
were not common. For example, one participant claimed: “I haven’t had any illusion regarding
police in the UK, there was nothing to change. They all talk a lot and do very little, they show that
they do a lot, but in reality not. Here is an example. I was stopped by police in Newmarket, they
checked my documents, and after 15 minutes of checking they asked me to move my car and put it
in front of their car, and I did it. They issued a fine of 70 pounds because I didn’t signal during this
manoeuvre”. Regardless, of such experiences migrant workers living in England generally trust the
English police. This is in contrast to the perception of police officers by migrant workers in Russia
and Ukraine. There respondents report a significant absence of trust and an overall negative attitude.
All respondents were asked to identify typical features of the police in their host country. In Eng-
land police were said to be “friendly, polite, fit, fast, competent, knowledgeable, professional, hon-
est, positive, trustworthy, do not lie, and work to abide by the law”. “Respect and honesty” were
mentioned by all of these respondents who largely agreed that English police were “friendly”. One
Lithuanian participant reported: “They look like they are honest people. . .here policemen can be
your friend, they do not want to create distance and be different from the others, I do not feel their
presence here, they are good men”. One negative characteristic reported regarding English police,
however, related to the issue of bureaucracy. Respondents claimed that there was excessive bureau-
cracy surrounding the practicality of policing, but that in general British police officers were “strict
but fair”. Only one respondent gave police in Britain a very negative description, saying that “they
hate foreigners, talk a lot and do very little”. The respondents from England also largely agreed
that British police are approachable and professional, stating that: “they are calm, not armed, look
friendly and are not afraid to smile”. This general experience provides a counterpoint to the mass
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of literature concerning poor relationships between police and migrant communities within the UK
(Bowling et al., 2003).
The above is in marked contrast to how Russian police officers were perceived. Migrant workers
in Moscow made the following remarks when referring to Russian police: “rough”, “greedy”, “ig-
norant of the law”, “corrupt”, “they show no respect to human beings”, and “are more concerned
about their personal benefits”, “cowards, greedy, and without principles”, “often abuse their work-
related duties, but all people are different”.
In 2011 Ukrainian migrant workers reported similarities between Russian and Ukrainian policing.
Typical respondent remarks included: “[Russian] police officers are very similar to Ukrainian, only
more aggressive and more daft”; “Corrupt and bribe-seeking behaviour’, ‘absence of the respect to
ordinary citizens, authoritarian style”, “police is my every-day problem, it does not matter what I
do or do not do, I will still be expected to pay a bribe”, “good police officers are the educated
ones” and “if they want they can work well”.
The previously referred to diary includes the thoughts of its author regarding his experience of using
the underground system in Moscow: “The eyes of officers on duty at each underground station are
constantly ‘hunting’ for victims. If they see a non-Slavic face, person with many bags or just a person
who is unsure about making an eye contact with them, they will stop them and start the document
check. . .. Even local citizens go out to buy bread with the passport in their pocket”. Interestingly,
however, it seems that not all encounters with police end up with the extortion payment actually being
paid. For example, the following encounter was recorded by the diarist: “. . . As we are placing the
advert on a multi-storied building, we learn that one old lady called police to report on our activity.
Police arrived and on their request we show all the papers regarding our work requirements and permit
for the poster we are working on. During our conversation, police noticed that my colleague speaks
with a heavy Ukrainian accent. Police, “where are your passports, you must be khokhlu [people from
Ukraine, the term often used to humiliate]? I say, “why do you think so?” They reply, “Who else
would do this job?! Go and sit in our car.” Our driver later told us that the police told him not to
worry, “we will take a little, and let them go.” They took us in their car to the police station and
stopped in front of the station. One officer, “So, what are we going to do?” My colleague replies, “We
are working legally, you can call our company, here is the number.” They say, “Maybe you need to
think more”. My colleague, “When I do something wrong, I know what to do, but we have all papers
in order, so don’t expect anything”. After 15 minutes of similar exchanges police say, “Go away!”
This extract shows that resisting extortion demands from police officers is challenging, requiring
resilience and persistence. In this case the migrant workers were working legally, experienced, well
educated, and aged over 55. Yet still they found themselves enduring a short intimidating illegal
detention in a police car. Moscow police jokily refer to this practice as “thinking time”. It is also
important to note that police use migrants accents to identify their country of origin, in this case,
the Ukrainian national was so identified and consequently referred to in a derogatory way. This can
be described as an example of nationalist or “imperialist” policing. While it is almost impossible to
visually distinguish a Ukrainian national from a Russian, the Ukrainian accent is easily discernible
to indigenous Russians. Such an example accords with the discussion of harassment of migrant
workers in Moscow by Light (2010) that targets a similar harassment aimed at ethnic Russians so
they are no longer “immune from document checks” (p. 299).
Nigerian migrants largely believe that the Ukrainian police “always take the side of the white cit-
izens”, and “always want us to be quiet when dealing with them on the streets”. The Nigerian
migrant workers perceive police in Ukraine as being “worse than in Nigeria”. It is possible that
Nigerian migrant workers view Nigerian police as less corrupt because at home in Nigeria they
have more chance to have their rights respected and to be policed equally. Ukraine is a homoge-
neous country, with almost 88 per cent of population being of Ukrainian and Russian extraction
(Index, 2016). The Nigerian community is therefore a highly visible minority and an easy target
for corrupt Ukrainian police officers; in this way racism might take on a mercenary aspect, in that
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police can readily identify a Nigerian and, once identified, the Nigerian becomes an easy target for
extortion. The Nigerian community has consequently adapted to overtly racist policing by identify-
ing areas of the city that are least likely to be problematic, those free from corrupt police and racist
locals, and modify their daily routine accordingly. One strategy for not attracting attention was
reported by a Nigerian respondent: “driving a car in Kharkiv is out of question for me, a black
man behind the wheel attracts road police attention all the time”.
MIGRANT WORKERS ABOUT POLICE IN THEIR COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
The Figure 4 shows how migrant workers perceive the police of their country of origin (home
country).
Respondents are united in giving negative accounts (between 0 and -1) to policing in their country
of origin. Nigerian and Ukrainian migrant workers say that in their home countries unlawful activities
of police officers are common. Nigerian respondents largely agreed that there were two stereotypes of
police officers in their home country: those who were well-educated, and then those that were essen-
tially uneducated, holding that the “well-educated stay in their offices and uneducated get sent to the
streets”. Lithuanian respondents complain of corruption within the police force of Lithuania and gave
the most negative response regarding their encounters with police officers there. Responding to the
question: “What do you think are the typical features of the police officer at home?”, a Lithuanian
respondent stated: “corrupt, ignorant, rough, impertinent, not professional, aggressive, cruel, boor,
arrogant, dishonest, mediocrity, do nothing, not trustworthy, do not think about citizens, have prob-
lems communicating, IQ lower than average, love to drink, believe in their superiority, often cross
the line of their duties, use torture to get evidence. . . [. . .] . . .love money, if you have money they
will speak to you, they had too much. . . [. . .] . . ..they are walking Gods, it’s best not to cross their
path, and everyone knows this”. Other Lithuanians remarked, on the subject of Lithuanian police as
“vile, impudent, fat because of bribes, arrogant, think they must have been bullied at school’; “you
are afraid that they will make up a case against you”, “they work not to help ordinary citizens”, and
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“they create lots more trouble, than establish order”. It is the Lithuanian group of migrant workers
who report the most visible difference between policing in their country of origin and destination.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
The experience of policing by migrant workers is highly complex. We consider three factors that
determine the perception of policing strategy in the host country by migrant workers: experience of
corruption at home prior to the move to the host country; politicization of police and antipathy of
the media and public in the host country; exploitative practices within communities of migrants in
the host countries.
Most migrant workers interviewed had experienced corrupt policing practices, and anticipated a
certain level of police corruption in their host countries. In the host country where migrant workers
did not experience corruption, they appreciated the new style of policing, often described as a
“friendly” and “kind”. The anticipation of corrupt policing is particularly relevant for Ukrainian
migrant workers in Russia and Nigerian migrant workers in Ukraine. Ukrainian migrant workers
arrived in Moscow with an expectation of corrupt interactions between citizens and police based on
their home experience. This group of migrants did not expect to find any significant difference
between policing in their home and host countries. In other words, they knew how to play the sys-
tem and were already familiar with the corrupt policing practices that they encountered in their host
countries. In this regard, their experience of the Ukrainian police played a critical role in their
adaptation to the policing they experienced in Moscow. They realized that in Moscow they would
be more visible due to the nature of their work and/or because of their Ukrainian accent. In both
Russia and Ukraine, police corruption presents a daily threat to migrant workers. The Nigerian
community in Ukraine reported that, in addition to corruption and racism on the part of the police,
they faced regular random racist attacks from the local population.
Continual social antipathy towards migrant workers is often sustained through biased, politically
influenced media reports and corrupt policing practices. Such antipathy thrives on reports of crimes
that are allegedly committed by migrant workers. Given such considerations, reporting on the nature
of the victimization experienced by migrant workers is a challenging task. This is especially the case
in countries such as Russia and Ukraine where police corruption creates an atmosphere of insecurity
for many vulnerable groups. The experience of policing by migrant workers could be improved by
better enforcement of their legal rights and police acknowledgement of the different patterns of victim-
ization experienced by migrant workers with subsequent action within the force to prevent it.
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